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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a computational procedure for interpreting
contracts in accordance with the English common law rules of in-
terpretation of contract as stated by Lord Hoffmann. Our approach
makes extensive use of an ontology of legal terms, specialised for
the context in which the contract was made. We illustrate the ap-
proach using three examples closely based on actual cases decided
by Lord Hoffmann.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a computational model of the interpretation
of contract in accordance with the English common law rules of
interpretation a stated by Lord Hoffman1 in a landmark decision2.
It uses an ontology to provide the basic meaning of the terms in the
contract, which are refined and instantiated in accordance with the
background information given by the particular context in which
the contract was made and the objective intention of the parties (as
would be ascribed by a reasonable observer). An interpretation is
considered valid if it, together with the contextually instantiated
terms, allows this intention to be derived.
Experience shows that interpretation of contract is a major part
of what many lawyers do, a task which is a frequent cause of dis-
putes: [8] records that “interpretation of contract remains the most
important source of commercial litigation”.
Legal interpretation, including interpretation of contracts, has
long been the subject of study in AI and law, including the first
published book in the field [18]. However, despite its importance
to the legal profession and its clients, there is surprisingly little re-
cent work on interpretation in AI and Law focussed on contracts.
More recent work on legal interpretation has tended to focus on in-
terpretation of statute ([16] and [4]). Contracts are very different
from statutes, because contracts are written in a particular context
to bind particular parties for a particular purpose, whereas statutes
1Leonard Hubert Hoffmann, Baron Hoffmann, PC (born 8 May
1934) is a retired senior British judge. He served as a Lord of
Appeal in Ordinary from 1995 to 2009.
2Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West Bromwich Building
Society [1997] UKHL 28
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are written to have a general application and intended to cover sit-
uations not even envisaged by the legislator, although they are, of
course, applied to particular situations. Moreover, while the con-
tract is taken to have a single meaning fixed at the time of signing,
the meaning of a statute may evolve as it is applied by the courts
to a sequence of cases. Statutes can even adapt to changing social
norms.
Recent work on the problems arising out of vagueness and am-
biguity in contracts has tended to focus on preventing those prob-
lems from arising in the first place either by careful drafting [1] or
by making the contracts ‘computable’3. In contrast, the approach
taken in this paper is to focus on how the vagueness and ambiguity
inherent in natural language contracts and the errors that occur in
them may be resolved by interpretation.
Our approach is based on the English common law rules of inter-
pretation, set out below. The approach taken by the English com-
mon law is to relate the words of a contract back to the context
in which the contract was formed - “language always takes mean-
ing from context” (Lord Hoffman4). So, for example, the word
‘claims’ in the contractual phrase ‘all claims are settled’ is cor-
rectly interpreted to refer to those claims that would have been in
the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the contract at the
date when they entered into it.
We claim that this work has a direct, practical application in the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom in that experience shows that
human lawyers have trouble giving priority to the contextual mean-
ing of a contractual word over its “natural and ordinary meaning”
(for example, the phrase ‘all claims’ refers naturally and ordinarily
to all claims, not just those contemplated by the parties at the time
of signing). A computational procedure which helped to overcome
this reluctance5. would be of great assistance to UK Lawyers.
3The Stanford Computable Contracts Initiative. See
https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-computable-contracts-
initiative
4In his decision on Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West
Bromwich Building Society [1997].
5That this reluctance is not confined to lawyers is illustrated by
the famous contract in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, by
which Antonio agrees to allow Shylock to take a pound of flesh if
he is unable to pay the money owed. Portia saves Antonio by telling
Shylock: Therefore prepare thee to cut off the flesh. Shed thou no
blood, nor cut thou less nor more But just a pound of flesh: if thou
cut’st more Or less than a just pound, be it but so much As makes it
light or heavy in the substance, Or the division of the twentieth part
Of one poor scruple, nay, if the scale do turn But in the estimation
of a hair, Thou diest and all thy goods are confiscate.. This may be
the literal meaning of the words but no reasonable observer (i.e the
audience) would believe it to be the objective intention when the
contract was signed. Indeed Portia’s solution comes as a complete
surprise to anyone who has not previously seen the play. None the
The English common law rules of interpretation are particularly
well suited to being modelled for three reasons. First, because they
are prescriptive and second because they exclude from considera-
tion the subjective intention of either of the parties to the contract:
it is not the claims that were subjectively intended to be settled that
are denoted in the example above, but the claims that would have
been reasonably understood to be settled by the reasonable person
who, at the time the contract was entered into, had access to all the
background information that formed the context for the formation
of the contract. Third, under the rules there is considered to be a
single statement of intention, and a single set of contextual infor-
mation, and therefore there should be a single interpretation. This
contrasts with statutes which are supposed to be applicable to range
of cases, and where the interpretation may need revision as further
cases are decided [13].
In overall summary, our approach to modelling the English rules
of interpretation is to treat the contractual phrase in question as a
structure taken from an ontology of legal terms, refined if needed
to fit the required context, which is then instantiated from the back-
ground information in accordance with the constraints imposed by
the ontology. For example, the contractual word ’claims’ would be
represented by the legal class Claim taken from the ontology and
instantiated using the background information so as to satisfy the
definitions in the ontology.
Experience and a review of case law shows that disputes over in-
terpretation of contract tend to fall into three (possibly overlapping)
types:
• disputes over the scope of vague terms;
• disputes over ambiguous terms and
• disputes over linguistic errors.
The primary claim that we make in this paper is that these three
types of linguistic uncertainty can all be explained and resolved
using our model. In section 6 we will refer to leading cases which
exemplify each of these three types of linguistic uncertainty and
show how, in each case, our model could be used to resolve that
uncertainty with the same outcome as was given in the opinions of
Lord Hoffman, the judge who restated the modern English law of
contract interpretation and who has done more than anyone else to
develop it.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out
the English common law rules of interpretation of contract as stated
by Lord Hoffmann. Section 3 describes our language, in particu-
lar the nature of the ontology we use. Section 4 gives details of
our model. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 gives three
worked examples based on actual cases. Section 7 offers some con-
cluding remarks.
2. THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACT
There is a wide range of rules of interpretation, since they dif-
fer from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within any jurisdiction they
may differ as between different types of document, for example,
constitution, legislation, contract, etc. They are probably all worth
study in AI and Law, both in themselves and comparatively. Here
we will limit ourselves to the English common law rules for the
interpretation of contracts. Even within those rules there is a range
of different ways in which they may be stated. However, we be-
lieve that the principles set out by Lord Hoffman in the case of
less, Portia’s interpretation is not challenged, neither by the audi-
ence, nor even by Shylock.
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Soci-
ety6 are foundational to any statement of those rules.
Lord Hoffman’s opinion in that case states:
“(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning
which the document would convey to a reasonable per-
son having all the background knowledge which would
reasonably have been available to the parties in the sit-
uation in which they were at the time of the contract.
(2) The background was famously referred to by Lord
Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”7, but this phrase
is, if anything, an understated description of what the
background may include. Subject to the requirement
that is should have been reasonably available to the
parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it in-
cludes absolutely anything which would have affected
the way in which the language of the document would
have been understood by a reasonable man.
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background
the previous negotiations of the parties and their decla-
rations of subjective intent. They are admissible only
in an action for rectification. The law makes this dis-
tinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this re-
spect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we
would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The bound-
aries of this exception are in some respects unclear.
But this is not the occasion on which to explore them.
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other ut-
terance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the
same thing as the meaning of its words. The mean-
ing of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars;
the meaning of the document is what the parties us-
ing those words against the relevant background would
reasonably have been understood to mean. The back-
ground may not merely enable the reasonable man to
choose between the possible meanings of words which
are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in or-
dinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for what-
ever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax. (see
Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assur-
ance Co Ltd8).
(5) The ‘rule’ that words should be given their ‘natu-
ral and ordinary meaning’ reflects the common sense
proposition that we do not easily accept that people
have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal
documents. On the other hand, if one would never-
theless conclude from the background that something
must have gone wrong with the language, the law does
not require judges to attribute to the parties an inten-
tion which they plainly could not have had.
Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when
he said in The Antaios Compania Neviera SA v Salen
Rederierna AB9:
6Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West Bromwich Building
Society [1997] UKHL 28
7Reardon Smith Line Limited v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1
WLR 989 at 995-996.
8Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd
[1997] 2 WLR 945
9Antaios Compania Neviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB 1985 1 AC
191, 201
. . . if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words
in a commercial contract is going to lead to a con-
clusion that flouts business common sense, it must be
made to yield to business common sense.”
There are two related characteristics of these rules in particular
which result in them being particularly well suited to being mod-
elled as a computational procedure. First, under the rules, inter-
pretation is clearly based on establishing a relationship between
the phrase or word being interpreted (‘the contractual phrase’) and
a definable set of information which formed the context in which
the contract was formed (‘the background information’). Thus, the
main task for our procedure is to establish that interpretation rela-
tion.
Second, under the rules, the interpretation relation is not estab-
lished by reference to what the parties, collectively or individually,
subjectively intended the relation to be. Subjective intention would
be very hard if not impossible to capture and represent given that
either or both the parties to the contract could assert, like Humpty
Dumpty, that “when I use a word, it means just what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less” [7]1011. Instead, the interpretation
relation is established by reference to what the reasonable person
would have understood the parties’ intention to be (their ‘objective
intention’). We model this by making three assumptions. First,
that the reasonable person’s understanding of the contract and its
context can be represented using an ontology of legal terms, which
will, as explained in the next section, provide a name for the terms
and a list of attributes that define them. These definitions of legal
words should be uncontroversial. Second, when the parties use a
legal term in a contractual phrase, then their objective intention is
to use the matching legal term from the legal ontology. Third, if
the background information discloses an objective intention that a
particular contractual word or phrase should refer to a particular
subclass then the ontology can be refined for the purposes of the
current dispute so that the equivalent legal term can refer to that
particular subclass.
We can summarise our model, using Lord Hoffman’s idea of the
reasonable person, as follows. We assume that the reasonable per-
son has an understanding of law which is represented as an ontol-
ogy of legal terms of the sort described below.
When the reasonable person sees legal words in a contractual
phrase, such as ‘claim’, that match classes in her ontology, she con-
structs an instance of the appropriate class from the background in-
formation. When fully instantiated from the background informa-
tion the legal words are fully interpreted and can no longer be vague
- their interpretation is a list of instances of the legal terms that oc-
cur in the background information. If the contractual phrase can
be considered ambiguous, then the reasonable observer “chooses
between the possible meanings of the words which are ambiguous”
by considering which will fulfill to the objective intention of the
parties. If there is an error in the contractual phrase, ie, “something
must have gone wrong with the language” (to use Lord Hoffmann’s
phrase quoted above in rule 5), then the reasonable observer cor-
rects that error by using terms taken from her legal ontology (which
are correctly formulated) to represent the contractual phrase rather
than the erroneous contractual phrase itself. This procedure is ex-
plained in more detail and illustrated with examples in section 6
10Through the Looking Glass is cited in the Court of Appeals judge-
ment in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West Bromwich
Building Society.
11A similar problem in relying on “private semantics” arises in com-
munication languages for multi-agent systems which make use of
the subjective beliefs and attitudes of the agents concerned, such as
[12]. See [20] for a discussion of the issues.
below.
3. THE ONTOLOGY USED
We have above referred to both “ambiguity” and “vagueness”.
These terms have some important differences.
In the case of ambiguity, a phrase has two or more meanings,
all of which seem equally plausible, and which need to be distin-
guished. This distinguishing can be done in terms of a more formal
language. Consider the sentence All members of my family use a
telephone. This could mean (and thirty years ago would almost
certainly have meant) that there is some particular telephone that
all members of my family use (i.e. a household land line). Nowa-
days, however, it is far more likely to mean that each member of my
family has a telephone which they use (i.e a personal mobile tele-
phone). In first order predicate calculus the difference is expressed
by the scope of the quantifiers:
∀(x)∃(y)(Fax→Uxy)
∀(x)(Fax→∃(y)Uxy)
In an ontology this would be represented by constraining the tele-
phone slot of instances of my family either to 333-3333 (which is
the proper name of some land line telephone, or to #MobilePhone,
indicating that the slot can be filled by any instance of the class Mo-
bilePhone, which may differ from family member to family mem-
ber. In this way ambiguity can (and should) be eliminated.
A vague expression, in contrast, has a single meaning, but its ap-
plication may be in doubt. This is well illustrated by the Sorites
paradox12. The use of vague terms such “heap” is inevitable: we
would certainly not want to specify the number of grains required
to constitute a heap, and normally all those involved in the conver-
sation will agree as to whether they are in the presence of a heap
or not. This is the open texture referred to by Hart [10], which
often needs to resolved by taking the matter to court and getting
a decision on the particular facts which can thenceforth serve as a
precedent as to what can be counted as a heap. Unlike ambiguity,
vagueness should not be eliminated altogether, although a decision
is required for a particular situation as and when it arises. It must
be recognised that not every possible situation can be envisaged,
and so sometimes the application of the term must be resolved in
the light of particular facts. In case law, as more and more cases are
decided the open texture, the area of uncertainty, is gradually nar-
rowed. In the interpretation of contracts, however, the vagueness is
not resolved in this cumulative fashion: we have a particular con-
text, and it is taken that the parties understood what the term meant
in the context of that contract. If “heap” is used in a contract, there
will be a specific contextual understanding of “heap” on the part of
the reasonable observer: the contract is not meant to cover a va-
riety of situations. In contracts we tend to resolve ambiguity by
12Descried as follows in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
The sorites paradox is the name given to a class of paradoxical ar-
guments, also known as little-by-little arguments, which arise as a
result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the
predicates involved. For example, the concept of a heap appears to
lack sharp boundaries and, as a consequence of the subsequent in-
determinacy surrounding the extension of the predicate ‘is a heap’,
no one grain of wheat can be identified as making the difference be-
tween being a heap and not being a heap. Given then that one grain
of wheat does not make a heap, it would seem to follow that two
do not, thus three do not, and so on. In the end it would appear that
no amount of wheat can make a heap. We are faced with paradox
since from apparently true premises by seemingly uncontroversial
reasoning we arrive at an apparently false conclusion.
selecting the intended meaning, whereas we resolve vagueness by
considering whether the example or examples in question do or do
not fall under the contract. This is illustrated by the examples in
6.1 and 6.2. The importance of distinguishing between ambigu-
ity and vagueness when handling uncertainty in law has long been
recognised in AI and Law [3].
Our ontologies will take the form described in [17] and [2]. A
class will comprise: a name, a list of superclasses, a list of sub-
classes, a list of attributes and a set of axioms. The subclasses are
intended to be disjoint and exhaustive. Attributes comprise a triple:
a name and a list of permitted values and a cardinality (although
we shall not use cardinality in the discussions in this paper, since
it plays no part in our examples). As one moves from class to sub-
class, attributes may be added, but the permitted values and the car-
dinality become more restrictive. Thus in moving from plane figure
to quadrilateral the cardinality of numberOfSides is restricted to 4,
and in moving from person to pensioner, the value of age is con-
strained to be greater than 60. A further move to malePensioner
would constrain both gender and age. Axioms describe relations
between attributes: thus for RegularQuadrilateral, area is equal to
longSide multiplied by shortSide.
As [2] makes clear, ontologies cannot be universal nor be ex-
pected to be task neutral, but rather they represent the conceptu-
alisation of a domain by a particular group of people for a partic-
ular purpose, to fulfill a particular task. Thus while we will need
an ontology to represent a kind of common sense understanding
of language (Wordnet [14] is often used for this purpose), this will
need to be supplemented by an ontology designed to reflect the con-
ceptualisation prevalent in the domain of the contract and the peer
group of the contracting parties. As noted above, it may even be
necessary to introduce subclasses required by the particular dispute.
Subclasses are introduced using a genus and differentia method as
in [17]. The genus will be the superclass of the new subclass, and
the differentia will comprise restrictions on one or more attributes.
Thus given a class animal (note that only the relevant attributes are
shown here):
Animal:
skinCover{fur, scales, feathers, hair}
birthMethod{vivaporous, oviparous}
legs{0,2,4,6,8)
we may define a subclass bird as a feathered biped:
Bird:
skinCover{feathers}
birthMethod{vivaporous, oviparous}
legs{2)
nesting{trees, ground, buildings, other}
As well as constraining certain attributes, we have added an at-
tribute (applicable to birds, but not animals in general) to record
where the bird nests. This will be specialised as we introduce par-
ticular species. Note that this specialisation does not define birds
as egg-laying: we may, however, wish to add an axiom to Animal:
Animal.SkinCover = feathers and
Animal.legs = 2 =>
Animal.birthMethod = oviparous.
This will ensure that all birds are, as a matter of fact, not by def-
inition, egg layers. The constraints on the ontology are designed to
ensure that the specialism is strict and that problems of cancellation
such as those noted in [6] do not arise.
Based on this ontology we can easily produce sentences in the
form of entity-attribute-value triples. Here the entity will be a class
(or instance) name, the attribute will be an attribute of that class
and the value will be a valid filler for that attribute of that class:
e.g. <jack, instance-of, animal> and <jack, legs, 4> will express
that Jack is a quadruped. Where classes appear in entity-attribute-
value triples, they are implicitly universally quantified. If an ex-
istential quantifier is needed, this can be expressed as a sub-class
or, for an individual, the name of an instance. Equally we may
write these triples as a logical relation: attribute(class,value) if we
wish to use them in a logic program. This enable us, if we wish, to
move smoothly to predicate calculus, or to a logic program using a
language such as Prolog.
4. A DESCRIPTION OF OUR MODEL
The model consists of a legal ontology and a procedure for con-
structing and instantiating data structures taken from that legal on-
tology to represent the contractual phrase, its background and the
objective intention of the contracting parties. The input is a con-
tractual phrase, the contract from which the contractual phrase is
taken and some background information. All of this will be ex-
pressed as entity-attribute-value triples: we presuppose the use of
some parser (many are available) to extract the information in this
form.
We describe each of the elements of the model in more detail as
follows.
The contractual phrase is the phrase that is to be interpreted,
For example, ‘all claims’ in the first worked example, below.
The input contract is the contract from which the contractual
phrase is taken. For example ‘Alice and Bob agree that all claims
are settled’ is the contract in the first worked example, below.
The ontology comprises a collection of interrelated legal terms
that the parties agree may exist and the definitions of which are
agreed between the parties. As described in the previous section,
the ontology takes the form described in [2] and represents a spe-
cific conceptualization of a domain for a task-specific purpose.
While we would expect it to start from a set of general and un-
controversial descriptions of common law terms, we assume the
use of only a selected fragment drawn from a larger ontology but
sufficient to represent the terms relevant to the dispute. Moreover,
we accept that it may need to be refined for each specific dispute:
and these refinements need to be accepted by all the parties to the
dispute. Perhaps this could best be achieved by embedding the
procedure in a dialogue game and have the parties construct the on-
tology by moves in that game (similar to ontology reconciliation
in multi agent systems [9], which is often effected by a negotiation
dialogue [19]). We leave this for future work.
Legal Sentences are composed from the ontology and are used
to reconstruct the contractual phrases and to assert the information
about the contact and the background. As explained above, in our
procedure, the structure of a legal sentence will be based on the
commonly used format of entity-attribute-value triples.
An example of a class in the ontology is:
Claim:
ClaimName: String
CauseOfAction: #CauseOfAction
Remedy: [damages, rescission],
Claimant: #Person
Defendant: #Person
Thus Claim has four attributes, one of which, Remedy can take
one of two values, damages or recission. Thus given an instance of
Claim, C1, <C1 remedy damages> and <C1 remedy rescission>
will be legal sentences, where an attribute is associated with the
values it is permitted to take for that class. This may be a standard
datatype (string, integer, real, etc), or a list of values, or an instance
of some particular class (indicated by a ‘#’). Classes may also be
associated with axioms to describe relations between attributes.
The background information describes the context in which
the contract was entered into. This includes both the objective in-
tention of the parties as it would have been understood by a rea-
sonable observer and the information expressed as entity-attribute-
value triples required to instantiate terms taken from the ontology.
The procedure establishes an interpretative relation between the
contractual phrase and the background information by first using
the ontology (modified if necessary) to define the contractual phrase,
and state the objective intention which the contract would be sup-
posed by the reasoable observer to be designed to achieve.The legal
terms pertinent to the situation are then instantiated using the on-
tology and background, and it is considered whether the intention
does indeed follow. This can broadly be seen as forming four steps:
• Step 1. Select from the ontology the classes required to ex-
press the contractual phrase, the putative interpretation and
the background information. Where required specialise the
classes to subclasses using the genus and differentia method.
• Step 2. Identify the objective intention from the background
information. For example, if there was a statement of ob-
jective intention that ‘claims’ refer to ‘claims for rescission’,
then the result should be that correct interpretation will re-
strict the remedy slot of the class Claim, to rescission for
claims covered by the contract.
• Step 3. Use the background information to instantiate the
classes identified in Step 1, so that the information can be
expressed in entity-attribute-vaue triples.
• Step 4. Check that the contract, using the putative interpreta-
tion and the background information, allows the intention to
be shown to hold.
The ability to derive the desired intention confirms the accept-
ability of the putative interpretation. Equally if the intention cannot
be derive, the putative interpretation cannot be correct.
5. RELATEDWORK
Related work falls broadly into two categories, that which ad-
dresses the problem of interpretation at the drafting stage by aim-
ing to minimise the need for it and that which represents statutory
interpretation in terms of ontological change.
In the first category is the work on logic based drafting such as
[1] and the work on computable contracts, such as that carried out
at Stanford13. Both these approaches are valuable in improving
the drafting of contracts and reducing the amount of ambiguity and
mistakes. However, our view is that these approaches cannot (and
do not purport to) provide a complete answer to the uncertainties of
language for at least two reasons. First, because many natural lan-
guage words and phrases are inherently vague. Well-known exam-
ples are the vague descriptions such as ‘heap of sand’ or ‘bald peo-
ple’ which may give rise to a Sorites paradox as described above.
Another example is absolute prohibitions, for example,‘no cars al-
lowed’ which may give rise to what Lord Hoffmann describes as
13https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-computable-contracts-
initiative
‘all or nothing arguments’14. He illustrates the absurdity of all or
nothing arguments as follows (paragraph 65):
“The following conversation may be imagined. A mo-
torist is stopped by a park warden driving down a road
which is signposted ’no cars allowed’. He says ’but I
am driving a green car’. The warden points out that
it is nevertheless a car. The motorist says ’but the
words cannot be read literally. Do you suggest they
forbid children’s toy cars?’. The warden concedes that
the context suggests a prohibition for the protection of
pedestrians frequenting the park and that it does not
apply to toy cars15. ‘And what about police cars going
to an emergency? Surely there is an implied excep-
tion for emergency vehicles?’. ‘Yes, perhaps there is’.
‘Well then’ says the motorist ‘if it cannot be read liter-
ally, why should it apply to green cars?’.”
Second, we would argue that there is great practical benefit in the
vagueness of words. If I want to draw your attention to a particular
quantity of sand, it is much more convenient to point and say ‘that
heap of sand’ than it is to specify the number of grains that I am
referring to. Equally, ambiguity may arise out of a beneficial econ-
omy of language, in that the same word can carry out several tasks,
but then it is important that the context leaves no room for doubt as
to which sense of the word is intended.
Therefore, we believe that there is a role to play for a procedure
of interpretation of natural language contracts however carefully
they are drafted. Infelicity and error may be reduced, but it will
never be eliminated altogether.
The second category of related work is work on interpretation of
statute by ontology revision in [4]. The general idea underlying this
work is that the concepts referred to in a statute can be defined in an
ontology and, when the statute comes to be applied, the ontological
concept may be extended or restricted by reference to the purpose
to which the statute was directed. To illustrate, one of the examples
in [4] is a law that bans vehicles from a park16. The purpose of the
law is stated to be to reduce pollution. A person is fined for riding a
bicycle into a park. This is because, without revision, a bicycle falls
within the ontological definition of vehicle. However, under the ap-
proach described in [4] that definition can be restricted: in this case
as a bicycle does not increase pollution, and so was not intended
to be covered by the law. There is strong and helpful, foundational
similarity between this work and our procedure in that they both
found interpretation on an ontology. In [4] the ontology may be
modified by reference to the purposes of the legislation represented
in the ontology. In our approach the ontology may be modified
according to the statement of objective intention contained in the
background information.
[16] does not fit into our approximate categorisation of related
work. It sets out a theoretical framework in which the many dif-
ferent types of argument used in the interpretation of statute (eg,
argument from precedent, argument from analogy, etc,.) can be
represented. One of the key advantages we have in representing in-
terpretation of contract as a fixed procedure is that it excludes from
consideration many of these types of argument that might other-
wise be thought to arise. For example, the interpretation of one
14Bank of Credit and Commerce SA v Munawar Ali and Others
[2001]. UKHL 8
15The warden’s concession is too easy: it is well known in philos-
ophy that a toy train is not a train, any more than toy money is
money.
16The fountainhead of this family of examples is usually given as
[10].
case is not influenced by what has happened in previous cases or
by analogies between the current case and precedent cases. Where
previous cases are cited, we see them as providing examples of the
usage of terms (in the manner of the historical quotations in the
Oxford English Dictionary) and so should not be used as the basis
of analogical reasoning. Thus our procedure does not use (or need)
any form of cased based reasoning.
Ontological change has been discussed in [5], in relation to case
law in [15] and in relation to reasoning with cases in AI and Law
in [11].
6. THREE EXAMPLES
This section illustrates the operation of our model on three com-
mon types of linguistic uncertainty: vagueness, ambiguity and er-
ror. Each type of uncertainty is illustrated by reference to a leading
English case that concerned that type of uncertainty and the output
of our model is measured against the opinion of Lord Hoffman in
each of those cases.
For the purposes of this paper, we have somewhat simplified the
actual cases in our examples (whilst preserving the type of uncer-
tainty they illustrate).
6.1 Vagueness. Bank of Credit and Commerce
SA v Munawar Ali and Others
An actual example of vagueness is found in Bank of Credit and
Commerce SA v Munawar Ali and Others [2001]17. This case con-
cerned the interpretation of a settlement agreement under which a
bank (BCCI) had settled the claims of its employees who had been
made redundant. The agreement stated:
The Applicant . . . agrees to accept the terms set out
in the documents attached in full and final settlement
of all or any claims whether under statute, Common
Law or Equity of whatsoever nature that exists or may
exist and, in particular, all or any claims, rights or
applications of whatever nature that the Applicant has
or may have or has made [emphasis added].
The question at issue in the case was, very broadly speaking,
whether that settlement agreement, which is a type of contract, set-
tled a claim for damage to the reputation (stigma) of the Applicant:
that claim was not contemplated by the parties at the time they en-
tered into the settlement agreement. Thus there was a dispute about
the scope of the term ‘claims’, and so it was vague, as it was not
clear whether or not is should include claims for stigma.
Lord Hoffmann found that the settlement agreement did settle
the Applicant’s future claims for stigma because, again very broadly
speaking, under the settlement agreement the bank paid all the
known claims in full and on top of that included an additional pay-
ment, in respect of any other claims that might subsequently arise.
Lord Hoffmann’s opinion was that the reasonable person would
conclude that this additional payment was in release of any other
claims, even those not contemplated at the time of the judgement
(see paragraph 47 of Lord Hoffman’s judgement).
Contractual phrase. We will simplify the disputed phrase to:
‘all claims between Alice and Bob’.
Input contract. ‘Alice and Bob agree that all claims between
Alice and Bob are settled’.
Legal ontology fragment. The fragment of the ontology re-
quired will include LegalRelation, which states that a legal rela-
tionship exists between two people.
17UKHL 8.
LegalRelation
PartyA: #Person,
PartyB: #Person
LegalRelation will have a subclass, Contract, which will inherit
the parties, constrain its members to a particular Type drawn from
a list of different contract types and indicatesthe date on which the
contract was made.
Contract
Type: {employment,
mortgage,
investment,
settlementAgreement}
DateMade: #Date
We also need classes for Claim and BreachOfContract:
Claim
LegalRelation: #LegalRelation
CauseOfAction: {#BreachOfContract,
#Stigma}
Remedy {Damages, Recission},
Claimant: LegalRelation.PartyA
Respondent: LegalRelation.PartyB
Settled: {True, False}
BreachOfContract
Contract: #Contract
Claimant: Contract.PartyA
Respondent: Contract.PartyB
Background information. The background information is:
• Alice and Bob intend to settle all their claims;
• there was an employment contract between Alice and Bob.
For clarity we indicate instances with the prefix “*”,
*Contract1
Type: employment
PartyA: *Alice
PartyB: *Bob
DateMade: *Date1
• Alice made a claim against Bob for breach of contract seek-
ing the remedy of damages in respect of this contract.
*Claim1
LegalRelation: *Contract1
CauseOfAction: *BreachOfContract1
Remedy: Damages
Claimant: *Alice
Respondent: *Bob
Settled: {True, False}
When the claim is made we cannot say whether it is settled.
Procedure. The procedure would apply as follows:
Step1 Select the relevant classes from the ontology: Claim,
Contract, and BreachOfContract.
Step 2: represent the statement of intention ‘Alice and Bob
intend to settle all their claims’. In the statement of the ob-
jective intention the reasonable observer will take into ac-
count the fact than no mention has been made of the cause
of action, and that the amount of compensation is more than
would be expected from the claims known to the observer at
the time at which the contract was made.
(<claim claimant Alice> and
<claim respondent Bob>) =>
<claim, settled, true>.
Note the implicit universal quantification over claim.
Step 3: Use the background to instantiate the classes: We
have an instance of Claim, *Claim1, referring to a particular
claim relating to a particular breach of contract (*breach1) of
a particular Contract, (*Contract1), also shown above. Thus
the following entity attribute value triples all hold.
<*Contract1 instance-of Contract>
<*Contract1 type employment>
<*Contract1 partyA, *Alice>
<*Contract1 partyB, *Bob>
<*Claim1 instance-of claim>
<*Claim1 causeOfAction, breach1>
<*Claim1 remedy damages>
When *BreachOfContract1 is instantiated the following also
hold.
<*breach1 contract, *Contract1>
<*breach1 claimant *Alice>
<*breach1, respondent *Bob>
Step 4: Add the contractual phrase and check that the inten-
tion is fulfilled. To represent the contract we make a subClass
of claim, those between Alice and Bob, which we call AB-
Claim. Now to implement our proposed interpretation of the
contract, we constrain the settled slot to true to represent the
position that ‘all claims between Alice and Bob’ really does
mean all claims between them, without further qualification.
ABClaim
LegalRelation: #Contract
CauseOfAction: {#BreachOfContract,
#Stigma}
Remedy: Damages
Claimant: (*Alice, *Bob)
Respondent: {*Alice,*Bob}
Settled: True
The different interpretations turn on whether we define claim as
above, with the differentia restricting the parties and the status, or
whether we leave Settled as {True, False} in ABClaim and add an
axiom that
ABClaim.CauseOfAction = BreachOfContract
=> ABClaim.Settled = True.
The intention will be true if we constrain Settled in the definition
of the class ABClaim, but not if we use the axiom to that class,
which would require a third triple in the antecedent of the objective
intention to ensure that the cause of action was breach of contract.
Thus the correct interpretation is to use the definition of ABClaim
shown above rather than that the axion.
Even though the background information available when the con-
tract was made contains nothing which would allow us to instan-
tiate any stigma claim, fully interpreted, ‘all claims’ refers to all
claims between Alice and Bob (i.e all ABClaims), no matter what
the cause of action. Note that this interpretation would also con-
sider any claims made against Alice by Bob to be settled.
The approach taken by our procedure broadly follows the ap-
proach taken by Lord Hoffmann. If the parties had wanted to limit
themselves to claims arising out of the employment contract, then
they would have said ‘all claims arising out of the employment con-
tract’. The parties were aware of this common law rule at the date
they entered into the contract and understood their contract would
be interpreted in accordance with it.
6.2 Ambiguity. ICS v WBBS
ICS v WBBS is the case in which Lord Hoffman gave his restate-
ment of the rules of interpretation, as quoted in section 2 above. It
concerned a statutory compensation scheme set up to compensate
investors who had lost money in a failed investment arrangement
under which they had mortgaged their homes to building societies,
to secure loans which they then invested on the advice of invest-
ment advisors.
In order to receive compensation under the scheme, the investors
were required to assign their rights to make claims against the vari-
ous promoters of the arrangement (such as investment advisors), to
a statutory body (‘the ICS’), so that the ICS could make claims
against those promoters. The general idea being, very broadly
speaking, that the ICS would recover money from the promoters
and then distribute it among the investors. However, given that the
investors might still have mortgages with the building societies, the
objective intention of the parties was that the investor’s rights aris-
ing out of their mortgages should not be assigned to the ICS.
The assignment under which the investors intended to transfer
their rights to the ICS stated that all claims were assigned to the
ICS with the exception of “any claim (whether sounding in rescis-
sion for undue influence or otherwise)”. The ambiguity in this con-
tractual phrase lies in whether the exception refers to any claim for
rescission or to any claim whatsoever (that is whether the ‘other-
wise’ relates to the grounds for the rescission, or to the rescission
itself). Again, this is a slight simplification of the ambiguity in the
case itself. Lord Hoffmann’s opinion was that the background in-
formation made it clear that the contractual phrase referred to ‘any
claim for rescission’ (ie, the narrower interpretation), the purpose
of “otherwise” being to ensure that the exception was not restricted
to those arising from undue influence.
Contractual phrase. We will simplify the contractual phrase
to: ‘any claim by for rescission for undue influence or otherwise’.
The “otherwise” is handled by allowing the appropriate attribute
of the subclass of claims (rescissionClaims), defined with claim
as the genus and remedy=rescission as the differentia, which will
allow several different values for the grounds (all those valid in the
parent class), only one of which is undue influence.
Contract. We will simplify the contract to: Alice agrees to as-
sign to Bob all claims except any claim for rescission for undue
influence or otherwise.
Legal ontology fragment. We will reuse the ontology fragment
from the first example with the addition of RescissionClaim as a
subclass of Claim. This will restrict the legal relation to Contract,
and the remedy to rescission. It will also introduce an attribute
grounds, to indicate why rescission is appropriate. We also need to
add an attribute to Claim to indicate the person to whom the claim
is assigned.
RescissionClaim
LegalRelationship: #Contract
Remedy: Rescission
Grounds: {UndueInfluence,
Deception,
Coercion}
Assigned-To: #Person
where Assigned-to is inherited from the parent class, Claim
Background Information The background information is:
• there was a mortgage between Alice and Charles. To record
this we will need to have Mortgage as a subclass of Contract.
We will also need a subClass of Contract relating to contracts
other than Mortgages.
Mortgage
LegalRelationship: #Contract
type: mortgage
property: {#building, #land}
Since subclasses are meant to be exhaustive we will need a
sibling for Mortgage:
OtherContract
LegalRelationship: #Contract
type: {investment, employment}
<*mortgage1 instance-of Mortgage>
<*mortgage1 partyA *Alice>
<*mortgage1 partyB *Charles>
• there was also an investment contract between Alice and Charles:
<*contract2 instance-of OtherContract>
<*contract2 type investment>
<*contract2 partyA *Alice>
<*contract2 partyB *Charles>
• the parties intend that any claim that Alice has against Charles
other than for rescission of mortgages are assigned to Bob.
Procedure. The procedure will operate as follows.
Step 1: We have instances of the mortgage, *mortgage1, and
the claim against the investment contract, *contract2. We
also suppose that Alice has a claim against Charles under
both of these. We also note that the subclasses of claim are
intended to be disjoint and exhaustive. We therefore make
another subclass of claim, as a sibling to RescissionClaim.
Moreover we wish to assign all such claims to Bob, and so
we constrain the Assigned-to attribute to Bob..
DamagesClaim
LegalRelationship: #Contract
Remedy: Damages
Assigned-To: *Bob
Step 2: We can state the objective intention of the parties
as stated above as being to exclude claims for rescission of
mortgage from those assigned to Bob:
<claim claimant *Alice> and
<claim respondent *Charles> and
not <claim remedy rescission> =>
<claim assigned-to *Bob>
Step 3. We instantiate the two claims. We need to decide
which of the two subclasses to instantiate, and this will de-
pend on the remedy. The claim under mortgage can be an
instance of Rescissionclaim and so not assigned be to any
particular person, but the claim under *contract2 will be an
instance of DamagesClaim, since its remedy is damages. The
claim under this contract will thus be assigned to Bob.
Sept 4: Check that the intention is fulfilled. Since the assigned-
to slot of the claim under the investment contract is con-
strained to Bob, then the intention is fulfilled in respect of
this contract. In the case of the mortgage claim, however, the
last antecedent does not hold, and so it should not be assigned
to Bob. Since this claim is an instance of RescissionClaim,
and hence the assigned-to attribute is not constrained to any
particular person, this is so, and the intention is fulfilled. We
have identified exactly the right set of claims, neither going
to far by assigning all the claims, not not far enough by as-
signing no claims at all.
Thus the contractual phrase is completely interpreted as any claim
by the investor for rescission, whatever the grounds.
The approach taken in our procedure broadly follows the ap-
proach taken in Lord Hoffmann’s opinion. He finds that an ex-
planatory note of the contract contained in the background infor-
mation “says categorically and without qualification” that the in-
vestor (Alice in our example) gives up any claim other than a claim
for rescission: and thus assigning the claims arising from the in-
vestment scheme. Lord Hoffmann also notes that “no lawyer in
his right mind who intended simply to say that all claims against
WBBS were reserved to the investor, would have used this paren-
thesis”. The intention of the parenthesis seems rather to make it
clear (to a reasonable observer) that the grounds are not restricted
to undue influence, rather than the exception was intended to cover
any claim whatsoever.
The objection might be made that, in reality, the objective inten-
tion of the parties may not be stated clearly enough so as to form a
statement that can be used to amend the data structure in question.
Our answer to this objection is that if the background information
does not provide a definitive statement of objective intention, then
the uncertainty could be resolved by a further rule being introduced
into the procedure that would give priority, in the absence of objec-
tive intention, to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
This would be in accordance with the fifth of Lord Hoffmann’s
rules quoted in section 2.
6.3 Linguistic Error. Chartbrook v Persim-
mon
Chartbrook v Persimmon18 concerned the interpretation of a con-
tractual mechanism for calculating the price to be paid to a prop-
erty developer under a property development transaction which in-
cluded some residential units. Part of the price was the Additional
Residential Payment (ARP). The ARP would vary depending upon
how much the residential units in the development were sold for.
The agreement defined the ARP as “23.4% of the price achieved
for each Residential Unit (‘Unit Price’) in excess of the Minimum
Guaranteed Residential Unit Value (‘MGRUV’) less the Costs and
Incentives (‘C and I’).”
18Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38.
Expressed mathematically and following the convention that op-
erations within brackets are carried out before operations outside
brackets, then the contract seems to express:
A ARP = 23.4% (Unit Price - (MGRUV - (C+I)).
On the facts of the case this would give a value to ARP of some
£4.5 million. Whereas broadly speaking, the background informa-
tion made it clear that the purpose of the ARP was to provide that if
a residential unit sold for more than its expected price, then the de-
veloper would be entitled to an additional amount by which 23.4%
of the higher price exceeded the MGRUV, ie, expressed mathemat-
ically,
B ARP = (23.4%(Unit Price - (C+I)) - MGRUV).
This would suggest that there was an error in the syntax of the ARP,
since common sense would suggest that the costs and incentives
should be deducted from the actual price (since the incentives are
offered in the hope of increasing that price) rather than some no-
tional minimum price.
Contractual Phase. We will simplify the input contractual phrase
to that expressed in interpretation A above: ‘Net Profit = Selling-
Price plus Expenses’: that is we will take MGRUV as $0, so that the
ARP is the whole price. Note that this phrase already suggests the
something has gone wrong: as normally understood “Net Profit”
would be the selling price after deduction of expenses.
Contract. Alice agrees to pay Bob 23.4% of the Net Profit.
Background Information The background information includes
• a statement of intention that the parties intend Bob to be paid
23.4% of the Net Profit. Suppose that subsequently, Alice
has earned income of $100 and incurred expenses of $10.
Bob claims payment of $25.74 (using formula A, the lit-
eral reading of the contractual phrase) and Alice refuses to
pay, since formula B would yield Bob only $21.06. In a deal
worth millions, the difference is significant.
The Legal Ontology. contains the object:
Deal
SellingPrice: integer
Expenses: integer
NetProfit: integer
Axiom: NetProfit = SellingPrice - Expenses.
We also have a notion of debt resulting from a deal:
DealDebt
Source: #Deal
Creditor: #Person
Debtor: #Person
Percentage: real
Amount: real
Axiom <#Deal Net-Profit NP> =>
Amount = Percentage * NP.
With this input, our procedure would operate as follows:
Step 1: Make an instance of deal: *deal1.
<*deal1 instance-of deal>
<*deal1 SellingPrice 100>
<*deal1 Expenses 10>
<*deal1 NetProfit 90>
Step 2: Identify the statement of intention. The intention is
to create a debt arising from a deal, ABDealDebt:
ABDealDebt:
Source: #Deal
Creditor: Bob
Debtor: Alice
Percentage 23.4
Amount: 23.4 * Source.NetProfit / 100
Step 3: create an instance of ABDealDebt for *deal1.
*dealDebt1
Source: *Deal1
Creditor: *Alice
Debtor: &Bob
Percenta*e: 23.4
Amount: 21.06
Step 4: Conclude that this supports interpretation B, so find-
ing for Alice. That interpretation A cannot have been in-
tended (at least by Alice) is shown by considering the case
where, because of a collapse in the property bubble, Alice
was only able to sell the units by offering incentives that
ate up the whole of the selling price. Now, while Alice
made no net profit at all, under interpretation A Bob would
be able to claim 23.4% of the Selling Price + Incentives,
which ‘flouts business common sense’ (to use Lord Diplock’s
phrase quoted by Lord Hoffman iin rule 5 of section 2).
There might be two immediate objections to this example. First,
while the procedure produces the same results as would be pro-
duced by Lord Hoffmann’s opinion, it appears to have been achieved
by a different approach. The approach in Lord Hoffmann’s opin-
ion is based on the reasonable person’s understanding of the busi-
ness purpose of the APR, whereas the approach in our procedure is
simply to correct the error in the contractual phrase by giving pri-
ority to the legal term in the legal ontology over the words in the
contractual phrase. However, we believe that this is a difference
without substance and, if helpful, the reasonable person’s under-
standing could be re-cast to say that the purpose of referring to a
percentage of the net profit was to give Bob a (reasonable) part of
the income. Net Profit is in the ontology because it is an accepted
business concept: in contrast, the rejected interpretation contains a
concept ((MGRUV - (C+I))) which is not in the ontology because
it makes no business sense: for what possible reason would incen-
tives and costs be used to reduce the minimum value? The only
effect would be to discourage any advertising and other incentives,
which would be in the interests of neither party.
Second, whilst our method of error correction works on this par-
ticular error, it would not work for all types of error. For example,
if there were an error in the legal word in the contractual phrase,
for example, if the contractual phrase said ‘all contracts’ in error
when it should have said ‘all claims’. As presently configured, the
procedure would call the wrong term and either fail to produce an
answer or produce the wrong interpretation. However, we believe
that the procedure could be developed to meet this and other types
of error.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We review our procedure by reference to the claims that we made
for it in the introduction to this paper: first, that it provides a com-
putational model of interpretation of contract able to produce the
outcomes found by Lord Hoffmann on three main types of linguis-
tic uncertainty and second, that it would be of practical benefit to
UK lawyers.
In respect of the extent to which our model is a computational
model of the outcomes of the opinions of Lord Hoffmann, this is
shown by the examples in section 6 above.
In respect to the practical value of an implementation based on
our model, experience shows that even the most able and experi-
enced practising lawyers sometimes have difficulty in letting go of
the natural and ordinary meaning and giving priority to the contex-
tual meaning of a contractual phrase. For example, in the decision
of the Court of Appeal in ICS v. WBBS, Lord Justice Leggatt found
that the interpretation subsequently preferred by Lord Hoffmann
was “not an available meaning of the word” (see a reference to this
in Lord Hoffmann’s opinion in the House of Lords judgement).
Whereas, as Lord Hoffman had previously observed, “Words in
themselves do not mean anything: it is people who use words to
refer to things”19. Therefore, it is at least reasonable to suppose
that a computer may be better at making a context-based interpre-
tation since it would not suffer from any temptation to impose its
own ordinary and natural meaning onto the contractual phrase, and
so concentrate on the meaning of the phrase in the context of the
particular contract under consideration.
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